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 Hobbes, of course, says nothing about the notion of equal marriage, at least 
in the sense that we understand that term in the early twenty-first century. 
We can, however, ask the question, “What might he say about it?” I will 
attempt to answer that question from two different angles. First, I examine 
Hobbesian arguments that we might marshal, on Hobbes’s behalf, to use in 
support of equal marriage; that is, in support of the proposal that same-sex 
couples should be able to marry. Second, I examine biographical evidence 
which may give us an insight into Hobbes’s attitude to homosexuality. I 
argue that there is some evidence that Hobbes would not have personal 
objections to arguments supporting equal marriage. 
 There are, I argue, at least three kinds of Hobbesian arguments that can 
be used to defend equal marriage. First, Hobbes argues for rough natu-
ral equality and against all arguments for natural hierarchy. His arguments 
against natural hierarchy take the form of arguments for the equal treatment 
of persons, including the argument for equity. Second, I claim that Hobbes’s 
argument for natural equality contains an argument for the equal rights of 
all individuals. And third, there is the argument that everyone has the right 
to pursue happiness; the right to a commodious life. 
 Hobbes’s arguments for equality have received a great deal of scrutiny and 
the conclusion of commentators has often been that the arguments are instru-
mental. 1 I have argued elsewhere that Hobbes’s arguments for equality should 
be examined on their merits as well as for their use to further other Hobbesian 
arguments about, for example, how to move towards peace. 2 And, we should 
not ignore Hobbes’s many rhetorical comments and remarks against the notion 
of natural hierarchy, which also support the view that he is sincerely commit-
ted to equality. I argue, therefore, that the weight of the textual evidence, with 
regard to arguments for equality, is likely to suggest support for equal marriage. 
 Background 
 First, it may be helpful to provide some background to the arguments 
that have characterized the political debate on equal marriage. In making 
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the case for extending the option of marriage to same-sex couples, advo-
cates of equal marriage have drawn attention to the injustice of excluding 
same-sex couples from the benefits that arise from being married. These 
benefits may be financial, legal or social. Marriage can be defined as a legal 
contract, as a social good and as a religious rite. It can also be seen as a 
civil status and a social practice. 3 In terms of political philosophy it has 
traditionally been seen as the way in which procreation, family relations 
and inheritance are managed by the state and, to some extent, the division 
of labor and resources in the domestic sphere. It has also had a dual role 
in moral philosophy as setting out how sexual relations should be con-
ducted or the parameters within which sex is said to be morally allowable 
or commendable. 
 Historically, at least in Europe and the West, apart from Plato’s unconven-
tional views on procreation and child rearing, marriage has been defined as 
between a man and a woman for the purposes of procreation, child rearing 
and family organization. Through the medieval period, the emphasis was 
on marriage as an economic transaction and to some extent this continues 
well into the modern era. Dowries were still common in some areas into the 
twentieth century. 
 The emphasis on marriage as providing the only permissible setting for 
sexual relations comes with Christianity and the natural law theory of 
the Christian philosophers. There are significant differences of emphasis 
between individual philosophers and theologians, but all agree that it is the 
God-given purpose of marriage, as governing the necessary process of pro-
creation, that leads to the sanctioning of sex within marriage. The Christian 
view of sex as, at least to some extent, inherently bad or sinful and as only 
gaining moral approval within marriage, is still influential and has informed 
much of the debate about same-sex marriage. A growing emphasis on the 
companionship aspect of marriage, which has also come from Christian phi-
losophy, is influential on the other side of the argument. As long as marriage 
is allowable between men and women who are unable or unwilling to have 
children, then sex can be condoned for the expression of a relationship of 
affection rather than purely for the purpose of having children. Once this is 
accepted, then it is arguable that sex within same-sex relationships, in the 
context of a stable, supportive and loving relationship, is also allowable. 
 Arguments against equal marriage are often religious and focus on the 
moral/religious impermissibility of sex between two people of the same sex. 
With the changing climate of opinion about same-sex relationships and 
their increasing acceptance, the arguments from those whose disapproval 
is grounded in religious belief have become couched in terms other than 
outright religious and moral condemnation. 
 Arguments in favor of same-sex marriage often appeal to liberal principles 
of justice: 
 Many arguments for same-sex marriage invoke liberal principles of jus-
tice such as equal treatment, equal opportunity, and neutrality. Marriage 
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provides benefits which are denied to same-sex couples on the basis of 
their orientation; if the function of marriage is the legal recognition of 
loving, or “voluntary intimate,” relationships, the exclusion of same-sex 
relationships appears arbitrary and unjustly discriminatory .
 (Wellington 1995, 13) 4 
 Three Kinds of Argument against Equal Marriage 
 The project of assessing what position Hobbes might take on equal marriage 
is problematic for many reasons. The debate is a modern one conducted 
using modern terms and with reference to current norms and mores about 
sexual relationships, all of which would be unrecognizable to Hobbes. And 
yet, I argue, there is enough proximity between today’s debates on equal 
marriage and debates with which Hobbes was familiar for us to be able to 
make some reasonable assumptions about what stance he might take. 
 The most common kind of argument that is made against equal marriage 
is one that employs the notion of natural hierarchy. Arguments for the exis-
tence of a natural hierarchy are common to Hobbes’s world much more than 
they are to our world, so this seems a good place to start. Many arguments 
against gay marriage assume a natural hierarchy in sexual relationships, 
with heterosexual relationships defined as the norm and therefore superior 
in the “natural order.” U.S. Senator Lindsey Graham (Republican of South 
Carolina), for example, has put it in the following way: 
 I believe in traditional marriage—between a man and a woman, without 
animosity, . . . I don’t mind if people are able to transfer their property, 
visit their loved ones in hospitals, but marriage to me, I’ve stayed with 
the concept of traditional marriage. 5 
 Here we can see the response to appeals for some benefits associated with 
marriage being extended to same-sex couples, coming up against a red line 
when it comes to marriage itself and the legal and social (and, for many, reli-
gious) status it confers. The argument, implied rather than stated, is that even 
if same-sex relationships should be recognized on grounds of compassion or 
human rights, so that the injustice of a denial of rights to property transfer, 
hospital visitation and so forth can be reversed; these relationships never-
theless fall short of the ideal of a marriage between a man and a woman. 
 In the Irish debate on equal marriage leading up to the referendum of 
2015, those campaigning against equal marriage argued, for the most part, 
from religious beliefs that dictated what was “natural” and what was not: 
 I don’t believe that homosexuals are equal in marriage. I’m not homopho-
bic, but I don’t want the idea of homosexual parents to be normalised.” 6 
 .  .  .  [Archbishop Eamon Martin] said it is a “fact of nature” that 
same-sex unions are “fundamentally and objectively different” from the 
sexual union of a woman and a man, which is “naturally open to life.” 
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 He said the Church “cannot support an amendment to the constitu-
tion which redefines marriage and effectively places the union of two 
men, or two women, on a par with the marriage relationship between a 
husband and wife.” 7 
 Hobbes on Natural Hierarchy 
 For Hobbes, those who argued for natural hierarchy were the establishment 
of the time, that is, the royalist, aristocratic ruling class (before and after the 
Interregnum). He was attached to this class, quite literally, as an employee 
of the Cavendish family who became the Earls of Devonshire, from when 
he left Oxford until his death. His attachment was such that he became 
more than a servant, perhaps, but always less than a family member. 8 And 
it is worth noting that he was, to a certain extent, distanced from the family 
in the middle period of his life, from his self-imposed exile in Paris from 
1642 to 1651–2 and on his return to England, when he lived independently 
in London for the most part, until after the Restoration in 1660. 9 I have 
argued elsewhere that commentators have perhaps been too hasty to attri-
bute political beliefs to Hobbes on account of his close associations with 
leading royalists and that this has led to “royalism by association” and also, 
more importantly for this discussion, influenced the way in which Hobbes’s 
more radical ideas on equality have all too often been interpreted as purely 
instrumental rather than sincere. 10 
 Hobbes argues directly against the notion of a natural hierarchy and he 
often criticizes those who argue for a natural hierarchy using strong rhe-
torical language. He is scathing, for example, about Aristotle’s infamous 
argument in support of slavery. 11 He argues instead that there is rough nat-
ural equality among all individuals, and with this argument he pits himself 
against the orthodox royalist view that there is a natural hierarchy, that is, 
that there is natural  inequality . The divine right theorist Sir Robert Filmer 
puts some of his remarks on natural hierarchy in terms of the natural hier-
archy within the family: 
 The king, as father over many families, extends his care to preserve, 
feed, clothe, instruct and defend the whole commonwealth. His wars, 
his peace, his courts of justice and all his acts of sovereignty, tend only to 
preserve and distribute to every subordinate and inferior father, and to 
their children, their rights and privileges, so that all the duties of a king 
are summed up in an universal fatherly care of his people. 12 
 Contemporary critics of Hobbes, like Filmer, were quick to pounce on his 
arguments defending natural equality, declaring that they were both wrong 
and dangerous. Filmer connects Hobbes’s support for natural equality to his 
support for natural liberty and sees them as leading to a right to rebellion in 
 Leviathan. He declares that this “dangerous proposition” (that subjects have 
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a right to rebellion) comes from the “erroneous principle” of the “supposed 
natural equality and freedom of mankind.” 13 
 Clarendon also argues for natural hierarchy: 
 And without doubt, the observation of all Ages since that time hath 
contributed very much to that Conclusion which Mr Hobbes so much 
derides, of Inequality by nature, and that Nature itself hath a bounty 
which she extends to some men in a much superior degree then she doth 
to others. 14 
 Arguments for the existence of natural hierarchies are often based on 
simple empirical claims. In these cases, one might think, it should be a fairly 
straightforward matter to offer counterexamples as evidence against such 
claims and demonstrate therefore that such arguments would be vulnerable 
to attack. Arguments claiming natural hierarchy are actually quite difficult 
to attack in this way because the weight of evidence, at least if we are talking 
about natural abilities and aptitudes, is often on the side of differences rather 
than sameness. 
 Hobbes is arguably well aware of the difficulties of proving exact fac-
tual equality and doesn’t attempt it. Instead, he grants his natural hierarchy 
opponents the argument that “there be found one man sometimes manifestly 
stronger in body, or of quicker mind than another”; 15 and then goes on to 
argue for what is often termed “rough equality”: 
 . . . yet, when all is reckoned together, the difference between man, and 
man, is not so considerable, as that one man can thereupon claim to 
himselfe any benefit, to which another may not pretend, as well as he. 16 
 He is moving from the empirical argument to the moral argument and 
it is the moral argument that matters here. It is what follows the argument 
for rough equality, in terms of how people are treated by other individuals 
and by the state or sovereign, that has moral and political significance, 
rather than the mere statement regarding factual equality. Similarly, it is 
what follows from arguments that there is a natural hierarchy, in terms 
of how people should be treated, rather than a mere statement of natural 
hierarchy, that has moral and political significance. In other words, when 
Clarendon declares that “[n]ature itself hath a bounty which she extends 
to some men in a much superior degree then she doth to others;” 17 it is the 
conclusions he draws from this about how people should be treated that 
is significant: 
 In all well instituted Governments . . . the Heirs and Descendants from 
worthy and eminent Parents, if they do not degenerate from their virtue, 
have bin always allowed a preference and kind of title to employments 
and offices of honor and trust. 18 
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 So, for Clarendon, the argument is that where nature bestows privilege, 
the sovereign should bestow rewards in keeping with that privilege and its 
entitlements. 
 Returning to the subject of equal marriage; how might Hobbes respond to 
opponents who argue that there is a natural hierarchy in relationships and 
that marriage confers privilege rightly, according to that hierarchy? 
 Hobbes’s Arguments for the Equal Treatment of Persons 
 The arguments used by opponents of equal marriage that refer to a natu-
ral hierarchy in relationships, use that natural hierarchy to justify unequal 
treatment. As Archbishop Eamon Martin says (above), the church cannot 
support treating same-sex relationships “on a par with the marriage rela-
tionship between a husband and wife.” 19 Many who oppose equal marriage 
do now support civil unions (although most argued against them in the past) 
as a concession to the human rights arguments and arguments from compas-
sion, about the denial of certain important benefits, while maintaining the 
natural-hierarchy argument against equal marriage. 
 The argument, simply put, is that the marriage between a man and a 
woman is naturally superior to any so-called marriage between partners of 
the same sex. The ingredient that makes that relationship naturally supe-
rior may be said to be the biological possibility of producing children, the 
religiously ordained status of traditional marriage, the “natural” biological 
functions of male and female sex organs, the longevity or “tradition” of such 
marriages as the accepted norm in our culture and so on. Whatever aspect 
of the relationship is picked out as the significant one, it is then argued that 
it would not be justified to treat relationships that lack the special status as 
though they are “on a par” with the superior relationship. 
 Hobbes has a slew of arguments at his disposal to counter this form of 
argument against equal marriage. They are all arguments for the equal treat-
ment of persons. He starts his discussion of the ninth law of nature, “against 
Pride,” with a startling statement: 
 The question who is the better man, has no place in the condition of 
meer Nature; where, (as has been shown before,) all men are equall. The 
inequallity that now is, has been introduced by the Lawes civill. 20 
 Referring back to his argument for rough factual equality, he makes a 
normative claim. Not only is it the case that we are more or less equal in 
our abilities, but it is not even justifiable to ask the question who is better 
than another; who has moral superiority. And then he shifts to the political 
sphere with the extraordinary statement that the inequality that exists now 
comes from “the laws civill.” He seems to be saying that inequality is a 
political matter. It doesn’t exist in any significant sense in nature and there is 
no moral question to answer that would put one person above another. The 
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inequality that we observe comes not from nature but from the state. He reit-
erates this point in  Chapter 30 of  Leviathan , when he says, “The Inequality 
of Subjects, proceedeth from the Acts of sovereign Power.” 21 And the moral 
question of how people should be treated, regardless of their factual equality 
or inequality, is answered unequivocally: 
 If Nature therefore have made men equall, that equalitie is to be acknowl-
edged: or if Nature have made men unequall: yet because men that think 
themselves equall, will not enter into conditions of Peace, but upon 
Equall termes, such equalitie must be admitted. And therefore for the 
ninth Law of Nature I put this, That every man acknowledge other for 
his Equall by Nature. The breach of this Precept is  Pride . 22 
 Applying this to the arguments from natural hierarchy against equal 
marriage, it seems that Hobbes is most likely to argue that whether or 
not the traditional marriage relationship between a man and a woman is 
argued to be in some sense superior, that is not a reason for unequal treat-
ment. On the contrary, same-sex relationships should be treated as equal to 
opposite-sex relationships, whether they are actually equal in every sense 
or not. 
 There is a possible counterargument that Hobbes is referring specifically 
to what is needed in order for people to “enter into conditions of peace” 
and therefore that this requirement to treat equally even those who are 
“unequal” might not apply in other contexts. 
 My response to such an objection would be that Hobbes repeats the prin-
ciple that we should treat others as our equals, both in the tenth law of nature, 
“against Arrogance” (of which more below), and perhaps most importantly 
for this discussion, in the eleventh law of nature, “Equity”. “. .  . [i]f a man be 
trusted to judge between man and man, it is a precept of the Law of Nature, 
that he deale Equally between them.” 23 
 Equity is particularly relevant for the case supporting equal marriage as it 
concerns the law and how the law and legal judgments should treat people. 
But it also goes to the heart of what Hobbes has to say on equal treatment 
generally. In a recent illuminating analysis of Hobbes on equity, Larry May 
makes the bold claim that “equity, not justice, is the dominant moral cat-
egory in Hobbes’s political and legal philosophy.” 24 He argues that while 
many of Hobbes’s readers are shocked by his apparent reduction of justice 
to mere legality, they shouldn’t see Hobbes’s narrow conception of justice as 
a rejection of the notion of fairness because that notion is fully recaptured 
in his conception of equity. 25 
 The prime duty of the sovereign is to procure the safety of the people: 
 The OFFICE of the sovereign, . . . consisteth in the end, for which he 
was trusted with the Soveraign Power, namely the procuration of the 
safety of the people; to which he is obliged by the Law of Nature, . . . 26 
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 He continues: 
 The Safety of the People, requireth further, from him, or them that have 
the Soveraign Power, that Justice be equally administered to all degrees 
of People; . . . For in this consisteth Equity: to which, as being a Precept 
of the Law of Nature, a Soveraign is as much subject, as any of the 
meanest of his People. 27 
 Hobbes could not be clearer in his argument that the duty of the sovereign 
is to treat all subjects equally. Applying this argument to the case for equal 
marriage, it seems clear that Hobbes will support equal treatment as a mat-
ter of moral and political principle, including the principle of procedural 
justice. And even if the relationships in question are argued to be, in some 
sense, less than equal to those of traditional marriage, there is good reason 
to expect that Hobbes will still support equal treatment. It seems safe to 
assume that if faced with a choice of policies, one of which delivers equal 
treatment to all couples be they in opposite-sex or same-sex relationships, 
and the alternative, which delivers benefits to opposite-sex couples that are 
not available to same-sex couples, he will support the former. 
 Hobbes’s Arguments for Equal Rights 
 As well as arguments directly for the equal treatment of persons, Hobbes 
also has at his disposal arguments for the equal rights of all individuals. 
Many of the discussions of equal marriage have been conducted around the 
issue of equal rights. Those supporting equal marriage often argue that it is 
a human rights issue—in other words, every adult has a right to get married 
and this right should not be denied to individuals in same-sex relationships. 
 The right to marry is enshrined in Article 16 of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights (UDHR): 
 (1) Men and women of full age, without any limitation due to race, 
nationality or religion, have the right to marry and to found a family. 
They are entitled to equal rights as to marriage, during marriage and at 
its dissolution. 28 
 As Amnesty International points out, “. . . this non-discrimination princi-
ple has been interpreted by UN treaty bodies as prohibiting discrimination 
based on gender or sexual orientation.” 29 
 In the tenth law of nature Hobbes provides a law for equal rights: 
 On this law (the ninth) dependeth another, That at the entrance into 
conditions of Peace, no man require to reserve to himselfe any Right, 
which he is not content should be reserved to every one of the rest. 30 
15032-0509-PIII-009.indd   168 5/23/2017   5:32:25 PM
Hobbes Comes Out for Equal Marriage 169
 He refers back to the all-important second law of nature 31 to remind us 
that “it is necessary for all men who seek peace, to lay down certain Rights 
of Nature; that is to say, not to have libertie to do all they list,” and he 
continues with a passage that sets out just how extensive the retained rights 
should be: 
 So it is necessarie for mans life, to retain some; as right to governe their 
owne bodies; to enjoy aire, water, motion, waies to go from place to place; 
and all things else without which a man cannot live, or not live well. 32 
 This crucial and fascinating passage provides strong evidence against those 
(many) commentators who insist that Hobbes is concerned only with the right 
to bare physical survival and who argue that Hobbes says the subjects give 
up all but these basic self-defense rights to the sovereign. On the contrary, 
he demonstrates here that all subjects not only have the right to self-defense 
or to bodily survival but they also have the right to “live well”; to live what 
he would call a commodious life. 
 I have argued elsewhere, and there is not space to do so here, that Hobbes 
holds a strong theory of individual rights in  Leviathan and that, contrary 
to much traditional Hobbes scholarship, many of those rights are not just 
“bare freedoms” or “liberty rights” with no duties on the part of others to 
respect them. With the second law of nature, Hobbes sets out a system of the 
transferring and renouncing of invasive rights which leaves us with duties 
to respect the rights that are retained by others. Each individual, he says, 
is “obliged or bound not to hinder those to whom such right is granted or 
abandoned, from the benefit of it: and that he ought and it is his duty not to 
make voyd that voluntary act of his own.” 33 
 If I am correct that Hobbes argues for extensive retained rights that should 
be respected by others and for the equal rights of all subjects, then he has the 
arguments to support equal marriage on grounds of equal rights. 
 I would like to briefly discuss one further Hobbesian argument that could 
be made in support of equal marriage. It concerns the right, in  Leviathan , as 
above, to a commodious life. In  Chapter 30 of  Leviathan , Hobbes says that 
the defining responsibility of the sovereign is “the procuration of  the safety 
of the people; ” and he then expands on what he means by safety, which is 
not, as orthodox interpretation has it, mere physical safety. It is something 
much more extensive: 
 But by Safety here, is not meant a bare Preservation, but also all other 
Contentments of life, which every man by lawfull Industry, without dan-
ger, or hurt to the Commonwealth, shall acquire to himselfe. 34 
 Now we have, in addition to the argument that all subjects have a  right 
to “live well,” a statement that the sovereign, to fulfill her office, must bring 
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about the conditions under which subjects will have not just the basics for 
survival but may also strive for the “contentments of life.” In “By Instruction 
and Lawes,” Hobbes states that the sovereign should achieve those condi-
tions under which subjects may have the contentments of life, by both public 
instruction “both of Doctrine and Example;” “and in the making, and exe-
cuting of good Lawes.” 35 
 Hobbes is saying that individuals have a right to a fulfilled and happy life 
and the sovereign is bound to create the conditions, both ideological and 
legal, that will enable people to live that life. It is an easy step from that to 
argue that people in same-sex relationships who want to get married and 
believe that being married would make them significantly happier should be 
facilitated in doing so by the state, and what is more, they should be encour-
aged and supported in doing so by the state. 
 Finally, I would like to mention two possible counterarguments to my 
position and how I would answer such counterarguments. 
 There is a passage in  De Corpore Politico that might be used on the other 
side of the argument, to demonstrate that Hobbes would not support, indeed 
would condemn, arguments in support of equal marriage. 
 For the temporal good of the people, it consisteth in four points: 1. 
Multitude . . . it is the duty of them that are in sovereign authority, to 
increase the people,  .  .  . And seeing this is to be done by ordinances 
concerning copulation: they are by the law of nature bound to make 
such ordinances concerning the same, as may tend to the increase of 
mankind. And hence . . . not to forbid such copulations as are against 
the use of nature; not to forbid the promiscuous use of women; not to 
forbid one woman to have many husbands; not to forbid marriages 
within certain degrees of kindred and affinity: are against the law of 
nature . . . it is manifestly apparent, that being so prejudicial as they are 
to the improvement of mankind, that not to forbid the same, is against 
the law of natural reason, . . . 36 
 This passage seems to provide support for an argument that Hobbes 
would be likely to condemn equal marriage and indeed to argue that it 
should be outlawed by the sovereign. What is significant about this passage 
in my view, however, is not that Hobbes says something so deeply conven-
tional in his early writing 37 but that he chooses not to repeat it, or anything 
along similar lines, in  Leviathan (or even in  De Cive ). The fact that this 
passage or anything similar to it does  not appear in  Leviathan demonstrates, 
I argue, that Hobbes has either changed his mind on this or thinks it is of 
no importance. There is a parallel to be drawn with Hobbes’s arguments 
regarding the rights of subjects that, as I have argued elsewhere, change in 
significant ways between his earlier writings and  Leviathan . In the earlier 
writings, Hobbes argues for the conventional view, held by royalists as well 
as by contemporary philosophers such as Grotius, that subjects must give up 
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their rights to the sovereign, including their right to self-defense. According 
to this early view, there is no right to resist the sovereign. 38 In the infamous 
 Chapter 21 of  Leviathan , however, this changes dramatically to an argument 
that subjects cannot and must not give up their rights to defend and preserve 
themselves, even to the sovereign, and that resisting or disobeying the sover-
eign can therefore be justified. 39 
 My argument regarding the passage above is that Hobbes’s failure to 
repeat this passage or something similar is evidence of his rejection of it, or 
at the very least, of a choice to ignore it as unimportant, in the later writings 
and specifically in  Leviathan. 
 Hobbes’s remarks on marriage and on the raising of children are restricted, 
in  Leviathan , to his own, at times eccentric, arguments from first principles, 
rather than echoing any conventional or orthodox views of the time. These 
remarks proceed strictly from his own precepts about equality, power and 
dominion. For example, Hobbes cites the highly unorthodox case of the 
Amazons, without censure, when he is considering whether dominion over 
children lies in the mother or the father, in the state of nature. 40 He also 
argues that if there is no contract, then the dominion lies with the mother, 
because the child is in the power of the mother and also because it can only 
be known with certainty that the mother is the parent. 
 The second possible counterargument I would like to address goes some-
thing like this. Hobbes’s stipulation that people must be treated equally 
before the law can be upheld if it is said that (traditional—i.e., heterosex-
ual) marriage is open to all (including those who are homosexual). In other 
words, no man or woman is denied the right to marry. 
 My response to this is simple. Allowing homosexual men and women to 
marry a member of the opposite sex may mean that the right to marry is 
open to all, but it would still deny those individuals the right to a commodi-
ous or happy life. It seems a reasonable assumption that heterosexual mar-
riage for a homosexual person will be less likely to be a happy and fulfilling 
union than a same-sex marriage might be. In other words, while saying that 
heterosexual marriage is open to all regardless of sexual orientation may 
seem to fulfill the requirement of equal treatment before the law, it falls foul 
of the right to pursue a commodious life. 
 In conclusion, Hobbes has several arguments available to him, should he 
choose to use them, in support of equal marriage. The next question is the 
difficult contextual one: would Hobbes want to support equal marriage? 
 Hobbes and Equal Marriage: The Context 
 Is there any biographical, contextual evidence that adds weight to the prop-
osition that Hobbes might support equal marriage? Before I address this 
question it might be helpful to ascertain something of the attitudes and legal 
situation regarding marriage and homosexuality during the time Hobbes 
was writing. It is always difficult to fully understand the beliefs and mores of 
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another time and particularly so, perhaps, in the case of personal and sexual 
relationships, when those relationships are legally outlawed. 
 Homosexuality or homosexual acts—at least those between men—were 
outlawed by the middle of the seventeenth century, but to what extent the law 
was enforced is much more difficult to ascertain. And it is more difficult again 
to know what people’s attitudes and responses to the subject were. As Merry 
Wiesner points out, very little was written about it, particularly about female 
homosexuality. 41 One place where it is mentioned is in guides to priests and 
monks about what penances to give for various sins. These do refer to both 
male and female homosexuality and generally give lower penances for female 
homosexuality. 42 In 1554 an English statute prohibiting homosexual rela-
tions made no mention of women, though a similar law in Germany two 
years earlier specifically made female homosexuality a capital crime. 43 
 The condemnation of same-sex relations at this time has to be seen in 
the context of the religious beliefs surrounding procreation and marriage. 
Any sexual behavior outside traditional marriage was seen as sinful, and 
pregnancy outside marriage, demonstrating guilt of “fornication,” was the 
most policed and condemned of these sins. Prostitution was also increasingly 
outlawed during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. 44 
 The outlawing of homosexual acts was something relatively new in the 
early modern period, along with the increasing criminalization of other sex-
ual behavior, “although the enforcement of sexual laws was intermittent and 
dependent on one’s social class and gender.” 45 
 A homosexual subculture started to develop in the late seventeenth cen-
tury in some large cities, among them London, Paris and Amsterdam. As 
the new subculture developed, men would meet other men of varying social 
classes in special houses for socializing and sexual relations. The increase in 
a particular culture and identity was met with increasing persecution. The 
Dutch Republic was the most severe, punishing “sodomites” with sentences 
up to and including life-long imprisonment or execution. 46 
 While women were not immune from sodomy accusations and trials, these 
were extremely rare and were most likely cases that aped heterosexual sex 
with some form of penetration or cases that involved women impersonating 
men and entering into “fake” marriages 47 : 
 The enforcement of many sexual laws was intermittent, and rarely 
applied to the upper classes, who continued to have extra-marital affairs 
of all types, generally with little social sanction. 48 
 What does all this tell us about the attitude Hobbes might have had to 
same-sex relationships and about what the prevailing attitudes would have 
been among his friends and acquaintances? It is very difficult to know how 
to answer this, but there is one piece of evidence from his correspondence 
that may shed a little light on Hobbes’s attitude towards (female) same-sex 
relationships. 
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 The Letters of François du Verdus 
 François du Verdus was a close friend of Hobbes’s from his time in France 
(1640–1651/2), when Hobbes was part of Mersenne’s circle of scientists and 
philosophers in Paris. Du Verdus was a member of the same circle and had 
been taught geometry by the mathematician Roberval in the early 1640s, 
though there is no direct evidence of him having met Hobbes before 1651. 49 
As Malcolm says, “From the warmth of their subsequent correspondence it 
is clear that Hobbes and Du Verdus [sic] formed a close friendship.” 50 He 
also describes du Verdus as Hobbes’s “most faithfull and devoted correspon-
dent,” 51 which is certainly borne out by the tone of his letters. There is one 
letter of particular relevance here written by du Verdus to Hobbes in 1664 
and enclosing a poem that du Verdus had written and wanted Hobbes to 
read. First, the beginning of the letter to demonstrate the warm tone men-
tioned above: 
 Sir, Your letter from Latimers of 28 July overwhelmed me with joy: I 
found in it that jaunty humour which one would scarcely have unless 
one were in good health, and enjoying everything according to one’s 
wishes. God be praised that you are in that condition; and may he keep 
you in it. Truly, I wish you more good fortune than I do for myself. And 
that is no formal compliment—I assure you, it comes from the heart. 52 
 And to the poem, 
 . . . Sir, here is that short work, “Iris”, which you say you want to have. . . . 
I shall always be most happy to do whatever you ask of me, if it is in my 
power. . . . The style is light and natural, like that of a simple narrative: 
that is what is good. But there is nothing great or heroic, or tender or 
passionate in it: that is what is bad. Or rather, it would be bad if I had 
written it for any other purpose except to please those two ladies . . . in 
three evenings I completed those 500 or 600 lines, which I gave to them 
on the sixth day. 53 
 The poem starts with the mythical characters of Phoenix and Iris and then 
goes on to describe the love of two real women, also named Phoenix and Iris. 
The following extracts give some sense of the poem’s content: 
 Listen to the story of the loves 
 Of another Iris, a much more charming one 
 Than the one whom the world marvels at in the sky; 
 Listen to what befell 
 The Phoenix of our times, 
 A much more fortunate one 
 Than the one (whether fictional or real) described by the poets. 
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 For even though Phoenix 
 Has made plenty of wounds 
 In other people’s hearts, 
 Nevertheless those other loves, 
 all those other hearts, 
 are nothing to her in comparison with the love and heart of Iris. 
 She gives a loving reply: “O my beauty, 
 If it is true that you love me, 
 It is certainly true that I love you. 
 And if you give yourself to me, 
 I too give myself to you, and am yours 
 And shall be yours for ever; I swear it to you, 
 And here is a pledge of that”: and so saying, 
 She kisses her again, and a thousand times, and again a thousand, 
 “Let us go to the temple, to adore God, 
 To worship the mother 
 Of our beautiful friendship:” 
 Those are her words; and they go there; 
 And they pray that Almighty God 
 Will deign to favour their sincere and pure friendship 
 And look kindly on it, 
 And bless it with happiness and good fortune. 
 And having made their prayer, 
 They solemnly swear 
 Their mutual, irrevocable pact 
 Under the hands of a priest, committed to that purpose. 
 Live happily, then both of you; 
 Let your loves be confined no longer to dreams, . . . 54 
 There are many ways that this poem could be interpreted, but whether 
one interprets it literally or in some other way, several things stand out. 
First, that du Verdus says it was written for “those two ladies” as though 
for two real women of his and possibly Hobbes’s acquaintance. Second, it 
addresses the subject matter of two women in love, whether this is intended 
in a literal or metaphorical sense. Third, it makes reference to the swearing 
of a “mutual irrevocable pact under the hands of a priest.” Again, whether 
taken literally or not, it demonstrates that Hobbes had no objection to such 
subject matter on religious grounds or any other grounds, as he requested 
that du Verdus send him the poem. We know, of course, that Hobbes was 
quite capable of thinking in unconventional ways about the roles and power 
of men and women from his remarks about mothers and fathers. 55 Perhaps 
this gives support to the notion that he was willing and able to think in 
unconventional terms about romantic or sexual relationships as well. It is 
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also worth mentioning that at this time it was not uncommon to find the 
expression of desire between women in literature. 56 
 There is one more piece of information that may be of interest regarding 
du Verdus’ friendship with Hobbes and the poem. In his will (drawn up in 
1666 when Hobbes was still alive and well), du Verdus left his manuscripts, 
which included translations of some of Hobbes’s works, “and presumably 
his letters from Hobbes,” to two people, with instructions, including the 
request “that someone would undertake the publication of three of his own 
manuscripts.” One of these was a book in prose and verse, the second was 
the poem and the third was his translation of  De sapientia veterum , “with 
its dedicatory epistle to Louis XIV and Hobbes.” Whoever did this, he wrote, 
would automatically become his sole heir. “Du Verdus desired this in order 
‘to obey the one person in the world to whom I was able to submit myself’, 
and to whom the two former works were dedicated: this act of piety was 
thus perhaps intended as a final tribute to Hobbes.” 57 
 Conclusion 
 I would not go so far as to argue that the biographical evidence above demon-
strates anything conclusive about Hobbes’s attitude to same-sex relation-
ships. But I think it may be of some interest, particularly as we know so little 
of Hobbes’s personal life and his personal beliefs. It may help to throw a little 
light on one particular friendship and it provides an interesting addition of 
subject matter for contemplation and discussion within that friendship. And 
while it doesn’t prove anything conclusive it does at least enable us to dismiss 
any possibility that Hobbes might be pious or disapproving in any conven-
tional or sanctimonious way about the subject of same-sex relationships. 
 In the main portion of this  chapter I have attempted to show that Hobbes 
has available to him several arguments that could be used to support the 
notion of equal marriage. His arguments for equality have often been too 
quickly dismissed or sidelined as arguments with the solely instrumental pur-
pose of instituting an all-powerful sovereign to keep the peace. When exam-
ined on their merits, I argue, Hobbes’s equality arguments provide powerful 
reasons for treating all persons as equals. And he is consistent in using rhet-
oric as well as argument to oppose those who argue for any kind of natural 
hierarchy. His arguments for equal rights and a right to a commodious life 
can certainly be used to support equal marriage. Taking all these arguments 
into account and considering them in the context of the sorts of arguments 
presented  against equal marriage, it seems probable that if asked to choose 
sides in that debate, Hobbes would indeed come out for equal marriage. 
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